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Narcissus and the Echo of Emptiness 
Steven W. Laycock 
University ofToledo 
Toledo, Ohio, USA 
The passion of Echo and the rejection of Narcissus constitute a paradoxical unity. 
Echo has the last word. Her word is reflective, distanced, merely descriptive. 
Narcissus, engaged perception, cannot speak. For speech and concept assume 
disengagement. Echo gives voice to the silence of Narcissus, and cannot exist 
without it. Yet the word "silence" breaks silence. Echo conceives the inconceivable 
as "inconceivable," and lapses into paradox. Narcissus enters into the inconceivable 
without conceptual distance. Far from "narcissistic," in the ordinary sense, 
Narcissus is not in love with ''himself," but with what, for him, is the other. His 
engagement with the "other" precludes self-obsession. For the eye, there is no eye. 
And for Narcissus, there is no Narcissus. The dualism of subject and object collapses 
into the ineffable experience that Echo articulates. 
"I N THE end," Salis (1988) tells us, Echo is 
"nothing but the words of others, a voice 
that is the death of the living voice" (p. 
85). This is undeniably so. But we must seek a 
deeper specification of that death. Juno punishes 
the loquacious Echo for concealing her husband's 
dalliance with the Nymphs by depriving her of 
the originary capacity of voice: ''You shall forfeit 
the use of that tongue with which you have 
cheated me, except for that one purpose you are 
so fond of-reply. You shall still have the last word, 
but no power to speak the first" (Bulfinch, 1979, 
p. 101). Receiving what she loved most, Echo 
became a shade, a sound-shadow, "nothing but 
the words of others," to be sure, but also the last 
word, the final word, a word to follow all words. 
We cannot "say," we cannot originate, a word 
without that word being subsumed, surpassed by 
its Echo. But to credit Merleau-Ponty's (1969) 
insight, philosophy "does not seek a verbal 
substitute for the world we see, it does not 
transform it into something said, it does not install 
itself in the order ofthe said ... " (p. 4). Echo is not 
merelytherepetitionoftheword, the [re]sounding 
of the word, but the substitution of the word for 
the world. Echo is heard when, instead of 
perceiving the rich and extraordinary presence 
before us, bursting with dynamism and possibility, 
engaging our vital attention through the negative 
pressure of its interrogative being, we pronounce, 
and thereby substitute, the pedestrian word 
"table." "Table" is the last word-a word of finality 
and death. It supplants living presence. To ''know" 
that this is a table is to presume that all of our 
questions about it have been answered, to 
foreclose exploration, and replenish interrogativity 
with the solid density of a presumed answer. Echo 
puts an end to all questioning. But for Merleau-
Ponty (1969), "the existing world exists in the 
interrogative mode" (p. 103). The world is a 
question, and everything in it. The things of our 
world beckon us to awaken to them. The question 
is the heart of the mind. But when Echo is heard, 
the question grows cold, and the mind dies. It is 
here that the spirit of Buddhism is felt as 
liberation from the mind-death of Echo. For 
Buddhism refuses to assume the finality of any 
purported "answer." No word ever deposits itself 
at the heart of experience without bursting into a 
thousand questions. "Beginner's mind" is 
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unending attunement with the openness and 
interrogativity of experience. Every answer brings 
forth new questions. But more than this. An 
answer cannot be understood independently of the 
questions to which it responds. Response is 
resolved once again into question, as question is 
resolved into response. And there is no last word, 
no Echo. "I -don't-know mind" renders the calcified 
assumptions of an all-too-solid knowledge into the 
fluidity of curiosity and wonder. The world we 
experientially inhabit is not populated by 
densities and solidities that would fill up the gaps 
in our knowledge. Our relationship to the world 
is not one of repletion, but of an ever-renewed 
opening and emptying. 
Though she brings death to the unwary, the 
unaware, the unawakened, Echo has a more 
benign appointment. Salis (1988) comments that, 
in Echo: 
... the voice is drawn out into a space which, 
rather than being simply filled by the sound 
of the voice, claims it and in a sense takes 
possession of it. Here there is a spacing that 
disperses the voice while also giving back its 
sound, that multiplies it while also letting its 
sound echo back as if from other voices. 
Hearing the echo, one then experiences silence, 
not as the mere opposite of speech or sound 
but as the open space of the voice. (p. 86) 
Echo "claims" voice as shadow owns its light-
denying opacity. And to the extent that possession 
is self-investment, the very self of Echo is the 
living originary word, and more broadly, the live 
interrogative being, that it otherwise comes to 
supplant. The [re]sounding of sound invests itself, 
invests its self, in the primacy of sound. Echo is 
not only a parasite, living off the originary voice. 
Her very being is this voice. The death-of-the-voice 
could not exist without her prey. But in preying 
upon the voice, she preys upon herself. Just as 
desire would extinguish itself in its fulfillment 
without affirming itself as desire, so Echo must 
affirm the living word that she denies and brings 
to an end. She returns life to her victim. Sound is 
heard afresh in the cavernous space in which it is 
surpassed. And Echo, like the wrathful visage of 
a benevolent deity, pronounces upon sound and 
its [re] sounding, the beneficence of silence. 
Echo and Narcissus, whom she passionately 
pursues, form a dyad, if not a couple. The two are 
united as much by Narcissus' rejection as by 
Echo's passionate attachment. For rejection 
preserves the form of the rejected. And Echo is 
nothing but form. Echo is the death of voice. 
Narcissus-the "death flower" (from narkao) that 
opens the doors to the underworld-is the death 
of the eye. Gazing into a fountain of water, dear 
as silver, Narcissus beheld what the stories 
account to be "himself," and fell deeply in love 
with his "own" image. "He brought his lips near 
to take a kiss; he plunged his arms in to embrace 
the beloved object. It fled at the touch, but 
returned again after a moment and renewed the 
fascination" (Bulfinch, 1979, p. 102). It is easy to 
assume that Narcissus fell victim to the perennial 
error of mistaking appearance for reality. The 
image appeared to be an other, but-in reality-
was himself. We are bemused and smug at the 
parakeet's similar error. It is said-we say-that 
the parakeet sees "itself' in the mirror and takes 
the image to be a :rival bird. But again, this is our 
projection. This could serve as an adequate 
description of the parakeet's experience only if, 
at some level of cognition deeper than the optional 
construal, it knew that the image was itself. But 
neither we nor the parakeet, and certainly not 
Narcissus, could know what is not, and cannot 
be true. The logic of mirroring assumes an 
ineluctable distinction between original and 
reflection. Image is not object. And I can never be 
my reflection. In this respect, Narcissus and the 
parakeet command the better part of wisdom. In 
the Zen tradition it is said that the eye cannot 
see itself. And this is true even if we gaze into the 
image-eyes that peer back at us from the other 
side of the mirror. For the eye, there is no eye. 
That is not me, but a reflection of me. Narcissus 
could not, then, have mistakenly assumed that 
what was really himself was another. What 
greeted him in the silver waters was undeniably 
the appearance of an other. But we cannot say 
that it was really himself. 
Bulfinch's (1979) interpretation of the 
Narcissus' predicament is classic: "He fell in love 
with himself' (p. 102). Thus, narcissism is simply 
self-love. But we know that this could not be the 
case. He fell in love with an image (that was 
already other to the original)-an image that 
appeared, moreover, to be an other. Edinger (1992) 
proposes that "Narcissus represents the alienated 
ego that cannot love ... because it is not yet related 
to itself. To fall in love with the reflected image of 
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oneself can only mean that one does not yet 
p~ssess oneself' (p. 161). But if the fervent 
outpouring ofN arcissus' love was directed toward 
what, for him, was other, we cannot say that he 
was incapable oflove. Nor can we say that he could 
not love another. For certainly he did love another 
in a sense far more genuine than one who-unlike 
Narcissus-would recognize the image as an 
image and nonetheless maintain the outpouring 
of "love." Prescinding from the postulated 
cognitive error, Narcissus' love was undeniably 
authentic. Narcissus was not "narcissistic" in the 
sense of being given to excesses of self-love. But 
neither did he fall into "a frustrated state of 
yearning for a self-possession which does not yet 
exist" (Edinger, 1992, p. 161). His yearning was 
yearning for another, not for himself. It is only 
we, not Narcissus, who, in placing ourselves above 
the situation, see that the "object" of his desire 
was his own reflection. That is not Narcissus' 
experience, but our own. And if narcissism, either 
as excess or as deficiency of authentic self-love, is 
possible at all, it is not possible for Narcissus, but 
only for those who, like ourselves, have the 
capacity to extricate ourselves from the 
immediacy of the experience, and survey the 
situation from the altitude of reflection. 
The suggestive title of Golomb's book, Trapped 
in the Mirror (1992), might seem to offer a better 
description. Unlike Alice, for whom the looking 
glass was a portal, a passage to a world beyond, 
an opening, and thus a freeing, for a world of 
magical, perhaps surreal, semblance, Narcissus 
could be depicted as imprisoned within the 
domain of semblance. But again, we must query 
whether this describes the experience ofN arcissus 
or that of the reflective spectator. Being "trapped" 
implies an impediment to our will, a resistance, a 
desire to get out, to break down the walls, rupture 
the enclosure. If Narcissus had felt himself 
trapped, we should expect from him an effort to 
return from semblance to reality. But this, we 
know, is not how the story goes. Narcissus' efforts 
were directed, rather, toward uniting with the 
semblance-or from his perspective, toward 
uniting with the elusive, vanishing other. For 
Narcissus, the face in the waters was real, not 
apparent. He had not fallen in love with a 
reflection-and certainly not with himself. 
Neither from his perspective nor from the vantage 
point of reflection can we say that he himself was 
"trapped" in the mirror. In the immediacy of his 
own experience, desire reached out to an other. 
And the mediated standpoint of reflection refuses 
to surrender the distinction between original and 
image. 
The lovely, and probably apocryphal, Zen story 
of the "transmission of the lamp," the succession 
from Hung-jen, the fifth, to Hui-neng, the sixth 
ancestral teacher of the Zen tradition, puts 
Narcissus in proper perspective. Hung-jen knew 
that he would soon pass from this life, and 
determined that his successor would be the one 
whose insight, expressed in verse, was most 
trenchant. Shen-hsiu, a senior monk, highly 
regarded among the monastic community, 
composed the following gatha: 
The body is the Bodhi Tree. 
The mind a stand of mirror bright. 
Take care to wipe it continually, 
And never allow the dust to light. 
Hui-neng, a simple rice-pounder ofhumble origins 
of whom no one would have expected great insight 
matched the first poem with his own: 
There never was a Bodhi Tree, 
Nor stand of mirror bright. 
Originally, not one thing exists, 
So where is the dust to light? 
The story is much richer than I am able to convey 
here, and the need for interpretation much more 
extensive (see Laycock, 1994, for a more extensive 
interpretation). But much can be learned from 
confining ourselves to the ''bright mirror" of the 
two poems. For Shen-hsiu, the mind is (like) a 
mirror. And Hui-neng retracts the analogue. 
"There never was a, .. mirror bright." The two 
poems seem-on the surface-to contradict one 
another. But this interpretation is blocked by the 
surrounding narrative. Were the two poems to 
stand in a simple relationship of frontal 
contradiction, then one would be true, and the 
other unproblematically false. But Shen-hsiu's 
poem was not simply "false." For on awaking in 
the morning, the old master called his disciples, 
had incense burned before the poem, praised it, 
and declared that whoever should put the poem 
into practice would surely attain enlightenment. 
One cannot assume that such veneration would 
be heaped upon claims that the master knew to 
be false. But if not reciprocally contradictory, are 
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the poems then equally true-perhaps true from 
alternative standpoints, the one true from the 
perspective of practice, the other, from the 
perspective of attainment? But again, this si:rJ!ple 
relativism of respect is impeded by the narrative. 
For after all, Hui-neng did win the succession. 
If neither is false, and yet the two are not 
equally true, are they then "unequally'' true? Is 
Hui-neng's insight "truer"? What did Hui-neng see 
that Shen-hsiu missed? On deeper consideration, 
Hui-neng's line, "There never was a Bodhi Tree," 
does not refute its mate, but rather amplifies it, 
displays its significance. If the mind is, indeed, 
like a mirror, then it must be mirror-like in the 
respect that, for the mirror, there is no mirror. 
The mirror reflects the color and form of whatever 
stands before it. But in principle, the one thing 
that the mirror cannot reflect is itself. Placing one 
mirror in front of another, what is reflected in the 
first is not "itself," but a reflection of itself. At least 
we, who observe from the outside, must say as 
much. But what would the mirror say? Does the 
mirror "confuse" itself with its mirrored 
representation? Does it identify "itself' with the 
reflected image? Does it make a "cognitive" 
mistake? The eye cannot see itsel£ And "Even the 
sharpest sword cannot cut itself; the finger-tips 
cannot be touched by the same finger-tips. Citta 
[mind] does not know itself' (Murti, 1987, pp. 317-
318). The mirror cannot (incorrectly) identify 
itself, confuse itself, with its image, since, for 
"itself," there is no "itself." The "self' ("itself') of 
the mirror is exactly its self-effacement. Its 
presence, to "itself," is exactly its absence. It is 
not simply that the mirror is self-effacing, that 
the mirror "itself' effaces itself, but that the 
presence of the mirror is exactly its ineluctable 
absence. To see it is exactly not to see it in 
deference to its reflection. For the mirror, self-
identification is unthinkable. It cannot, in 
principle, identify itself with its image, because 
there is no "itself." In this respect, we credit 
Wittgenstein's (197 4) recognition that "to say of 
two things that they are identical is nonsense, 
and to say of one thing that it is identical with 
itself is to say nothing at all" (p. 52: 5.5303). For 
the mirror, the mirror and its reflection are not 
two, original and reflection. But they are also not 
one (in contrast to two). To count-even to one-
is to assume an external vantage point. From the 
standpoint of the mirror, its image is numberless, 
trans ordinal. 
From the standpoint of the mirror, also, there 
is no relationship, and certainly not a "relation," 
that spans or unifies the purported duality of 
original and representation. Relationship is a 
phenomenon of the disengaged, third-personal 
perspective. From its own standpoint, the mirror 
does not stand in a relationship of representation, 
identification, even openness, to a purported 
"other." There is no "other." This is not to assume 
that there is only the mirror. For the mirror, to be 
is exactly not to be for itself. Dogen Zenji, the great 
thirteenth-century master of the Soto Zen 
tradition, declared that "Since there is no mind 
in me, when I hear the sound of raindrops from 
the eaves, the raindrop is myself' (in Kotoh, 1987, 
p. 206). But this is not to say that a mirror-like 
mind identifies "itself" with the raindrops. Rather, 
the only "self," the only self-presence, that mind 
could in any way possess is the presence of the 
raindrops. And if subjectivity cannot be 
experienced as such, then the content of our 
experience cannot be described as "objects." 
"Narcissus," then, names the openness in 
which being appears. But this openness is never 
objectifiable, never a being. And we can speak of 
openness and that which comes to fill it only from 
an external point of view. For Narcissus, there is 
no openness. For Narcissus, there is no Narcissus. 
And a fortiori, for Narcissus, there is no Narcissus 
in passionate, futile pursuit of ''himself." Indeed, 
Narcissus could not see the image in the silvery 
waters as himself. For the hermeneutic "as" 
entails a certain distantiation, a certain stepping-
back, that enables a peripheral glimpse of the 
object that we construe under a given interpretive 
form. But the "self'-Narcissus ''himself'-can 
never be glimpsed in this way. The image can 
never be seen "as" himself or "as" another. And 
the supposition that Narcissus is "narcissistic" is 
thereby cut off. 
Are we, then, who stand outside, we outsiders, 
to be accounted wrong in our construal that 
Narcissus sees his own image? Is reflective 
consciousness that situates itself outside the event 
that it observes to be accounted wrong in its 
postulation of an intentional relationship 
spanning subject and object? In Merleau-Ponty's 
(1969) insightful confession, "I should say that 
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there was there a thing perceived and an openness 
upon this thing which the reflection has 
neutralized and transformed into perception-
reflected-on and thing-perceived-within-a-
perception-reflected-on" (p. 38). Perception is not 
perception-reflected-on. Nor is the perceived the 
thing-perceived-within-a-perception-reflected-on. 
Far from laying bare what was there from the 
beginning, [dis] closing an intrinsic but 
unrecognized structure oflive perception, reflection 
changes the subject. And we, as outsiders, are 
likewise incapable of seeing what Narcissus sees 
and seeing as he sees. But again, are we "wrong''? 
For surely, if we are, then Narcissus is "right." 
Who sees the image the right way? Narcissus does 
not see an image at all. Who sees the elusive 
youth the right way? We do not see the youth at 
all! And we can only say that the two points of 
view-the engaged and the disengaged-are 
incommensurable. We are not subject to delusive 
appearance. But neither are we "right." We simply 
cannot see what Narcissus sees without being 
engaged as Narcissus is engaged. The appearance/ 
reality schema has no work to do here. 
Nagel's (1979) famous question, ''What is it like 
to be a bat?" might first be met with speculations 
concerning what it would be like for us-
intelligent, human, humanoid-to be bats. We can 
imagine ourselves hanging upside down for hours, 
spreading our wings, flying blindly by sonar 
through a dark cave and eating bugs. But this 
does not respond to Nagel's question. Nagel asks 
what it is like for the bat to be a bat. And this 
question, if properly understood, is met by 
uncomprehending silence. We simply have no 
idea. The bat is a question mark. And any attempt 
to resolve or diminish its interrogativity is 
inevitably the insertion of our own perspective 
into the scene, and therefore a change of subject. 
Parsons (1976) observes that, "We continuously 
seek closure in our meanings and identities, yet 
we cannot tolerate the constrictions they lay upon 
us ... " (p. 3). But our intolerance is hopeless. We 
live in a world of question marks. Narcissus is a 
question mark. What is it like to be a snail? A 
grasshopper? A carrot? What is it like to be 
Narcissus? We see as he sees only by becoming 
him, by ceasing to be what we are: outsiders. 
But the issue is deeper still. Despite Sartre's 
(1971) postulation that the question is posed "on 
the basis of a preinterrogative familiarity with 
being'' (p. 35), we must say, with regard to the 
question marks that inhabit our experience, that 
"no answer ever preceded the question ... " 
(Bataille, 1988, p. 36). The interrogative precedes 
the assertoric. And even thought, which purports 
to concern itselfwith the formulation of truth, is 
"suspended in the daze of the question" (Gillan, 
1980, p. 142). In the enigmatic pronouncement of 
Fa-yen Wen-i, "Not knowing most closely 
approaches the Truth" (Chang, 1971, p. 239). It 
is the question, not the answer, that is the "truth." 
Thus, in Burke's admonition: 
This question-knowing provides a reflective 
and intuitive access to Being which 
philosophers of intuition and reflection quickly 
sought to close up by trying to prove that the 
answer was already contained in the question; 
for them the "meaning'' of Being was prior to 
the question, for it was contained a priori in 
the mind ... (Burke, 1990, p. 88) 
But a question that embraces its own answer is 
not a genuine question, but rather a rhetorical 
ploy. The question is a modality of openness. 
Sartre (1971) tells us that questioning is 
conditioned by "the non-being ofknowing in man" 
(p. 36). Agacinski (1991) writes that "the status 
of the subject is inseparable from the status of 
the question" (p. 9).And in Merleau-Ponty's (1969) 
radicalized observation, ''we ourselves are one sole 
continued question" (p. 103). But if so, then to 
the extent and in the respect that we are 
openness, we are not the saturating opacity of 
response. To the extent and in the respect that 
the nonbeing of knowing conditions us, we are 
not, then, conditioned by a quasi-indicative pre-
interrogative familiarity with being. And if we 
genuinely are interrogative openness, then we 
cannot look "within" for the answer. For there is 
nothing to see. The authentic question is an abyss 
without hope of repletion. 
There are two types of question and two types 
of answer. There are genuinely open questions 
that absorb their answers into themselves, 
suspending, engulfing them, in the free and 
boundless space ofinterrogativity. And there are 
the tight, contoured pockets of delimited openness 
that call for remainder less saturation. Responses 
float in interrogative space. Information fills it 
up, abolishes it. And to say, with Merleau-Ponty 
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(1969), that philosophy "does not raise questions 
and does not provide answers that would little by 
little :fill in the blanks" (p. 105), is to say that 
philosophy opens itself to response, not to 
information. It may be, as Sartre (1971) tells us, 
that "the question is a kind of expectation; I expect 
a reply from the being questioned" (p. 35). But 
repletion is the death of the question, the death 
of ourselves as questions. And questioning is the 
life of the mind. If the "reply" expected were 
information, then questioning would be suicide. 
But "the interrogative is not a mode derived by 
inversion or by reversal of the indicative ... " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1969, p. 129). And this is because 
genuine questioning cannot be decisively put to 
rest. There is no last word-no Echo. 
What is it like to be Narcissus? What is it like 
to kneel at the water's edge and to see as Narcissus 
sees? We who stand outside, we outsiders, can 
assume Narcissus' place only by importing the 
structures that inform our observations, the 
contrast of original and representation. We can 
construe our projection only in this light. We have 
never been bats. But we have all kneU at the 
water's edge. We, as reflective observers, have all 
been engaged in immediate, prereflective life. And 
while our reflective stance provides no insight, 
our recollections do. We can collect ourselves, 
[re]collect, [re]member. In the rich suggestions of 
the German, we can enact Er-innerung: a 
deepened interiorization, a gathering, a drawing 
inward. Sati, the Pali for "mindfulness" or 
"awareness" still supports the resonance of the 
Sanskrit smriti which connotes remembrance, a 
keeping-in-mind. Presence of mind is rich with 
overlarded layers of the passed and the past. 
Presence is alive with absence. And it is because 
we are capable of gathering the petals of 
experience that have fallen along our path that 
we outsiders know what it is like not yet to be 
"outside." And we are capable of comparing the 
womb of immediacy with the domain of post-
parturition alienation. We know that Narcissus 
does not see an "image," that, in his experience, 
there is no "relationship" to the other, and in fact, 
that there is no "other" at all-for there is no 
"same." Merleau-Ponty (1969) is correct in his 
assessment that, "We must, at the beginning, 
eschew notions such as 'acts of consciousness,' 
'matter,' 'form,' and even 'image' and 'perception' " 
(p. 129). "At the beginning," in Narcissus' original 
perception, there is no perception at all! In the 
words of Hui-neng's poem, "originally [ben lai], 
not one thing exists [wu i wu] ." The "beginning," 
the "origin," is not to be understood as a 
fundament, a principium, an arche. It is not the 
first element in a continuing series, but is rather 
transordinal. With resolvable paradox, we can say 
that the origin is exactly the absence of origin. 
And original awareness, as the repudiation of self-
reflexivity, is the very absence of "itself" as the 
founding element of the subject/object order. Sati, 
the in-gathering of the mind in presence, is the 
[re]collection that, from this "original" stance, 
there :is no origin, no mind, no subject, no self. It 
is the realization of anatman. In Merleau-Ponty's 
(1969) words, "I do not perceive any more than I 
speak ... " (p. 190). Echo cannot truly speak, she 
can only repeat. Her words are descriptive, 
articulatory, at best expressive, but not creative. 
Narcissus cannot speak because, for Narcissus, 
there is no speaker. Echo's speech is a non original 
articulation of Narcissus' original absence of 
speech, "The expression of what is before 
expression ... " (p. 167). 
We, then, we outsiders, play the part of Shen-
hsiu. For us, the mind is a mirror. For us, the 
mind of Narcissus is mirror posed against a mir-
ror. If this were wrong, Hung-jen would have 
driven us away and ripped down our poem. But 
we have not yet seen the extraordinary implica-
tions of our own external stance. If Narcissus is a 
mirror opening onto a mirror, then for Narcissus, 
there is no mirror, no image, no Narcissus. We 
cannot understand our own alienated description 
without being immediately transposed back into 
the "origin" (which is no origin). Bresson (1958) 
suggests that "The phenomenological description 
is at the limit unrealizable and interior experi-
ence ineffable" (p. 156). Reflection :is not the 
awakening of selfless awareness. But the deep-
ening of reflection inevitably leads in that 
direction. 
Despite his indifference, his refusal of her 
attention, Narcissus forms with Echo a curious 
doublet, a "couple." And now we know why. 
Narcissus, the "origin," stands in no order of 
relationship to "himself" or to an "other." He 
rejects Echo. But the rejection is a rejection of 
dualistic "relationship." To the extent that his 
rejection is specific, what he rejects in Echo is her 
inability to attain the originary, her status as 
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outsider, onlooker. In Dumery's (1964) view, 
philosophy, like a parasite, "always comes after 
life. Philosophy is a recovery oflife, but it cannot 
be identified with life ... Reflection lives on concrete 
life" (pp. 5-6). And Echo is parasitic reflection. But 
to this extent, Echo is also reflection unaware of 
itself. In Merleau-Ponty's (1969) very different 
appreciation, "philosophy is the reconversion of 
silence and speech into one another ... " (p. 129). 
The external vantage point of the reflective Echo 
provides a space of articulation, the possibility of 
interpolating the predicative tie between the 
objects and qualities of perception. Narcissus 
might see a red apple. Echo sees, and says, that 
the apple is red. Echo articulates, breaks silence. 
But Echo is always pursued by silence. Narcissus, 
the immediate, the original, cannot speak. For 
discursivity assumes distance. And Narcissus is 
not an outsider to his own experience. Hui-neng 
converts speech into silence with his realization 
that, for the mirror, there is no mirror, and 
converts silence into speech with the concomitant 
insight that the universal and ineluctable absence 
of the mirror is exactly its presence. "Outside" is 
converted into "inside," and "inside" into "outside." 
Echo becomes Narcissus and Narcissus becomes 
Echo. With seeming paradox, it is the negativity 
of Narcissus' rejection, his refusal of Echo, that 
enables the reconversion of silence into speech and 
conversely. If Narcissus had accepted Echo, had 
simply validated her reflective description, he 
would have taken into his own experience the 
polarities of subject and object, original and 
derivative, presentation and representation, that 
form and inform her analysis. He would, that is, 
have become an outsider himself, and, as 
Narcissus, would have vanished. The interplay 
of Echo and Narcissus is nowhere more evident 
than in Merleau-Ponty's (1969) intriguing 
exposition of the dance of philosophy: 
The philosopher speaks, but this is a weakness 
in him, and an inexplicable weakness: he 
should keep silent, coincide in silence, and 
rejoin in Being a philosophy that is there 
ready-made. But yet everything comes to pass 
as though he wished to put into words a certain 
silence he hearkens to within himself. His 
entire "work" is this absurd effort. He wrote 
in order to state his contact with Being; he did 
not state it, and could not state it, since it is 
silence. Then he recommences ... (p. 125) 
Echo is condemned to repetition. But Narcissus 
is silent. She cannot repeat what he says. But she 
can give voice to his silence. She can "make it 
say ... what in its silence it means to say ... " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1969, p. 39). And in this way, 
"language realizes, by breaking the silence, what 
the silence wished and did not obtain" (p. 176). If 
phenomenological description expresses ineffable 
immediacy, we must also see that "The absence 
oflanguage is pregnant with the pure possibility 
of all language" (Coward, 1990, p. 101). Caputo 
(1993) recognizes that: 
"Ineffability" is a high-powered discursive 
resource, the product of a language that has 
been refined and defined until it is sharp enough 
and nuanced enough to announce all this 
ineffability. "Unsayability" is a modification of 
what is sayable ... By the time one has said that 
something is ineffable, or that one cannot say a 
thing, one has already been speaking for some 
time and one has already said too much. (p. 75) 
Echo conceives the inconceivable as inconceivable. 
Echo sees that the formless differs from the 
formed by its form. As Bataille (1988) says, "the 
word silence is still a sound ... " (p. 13). And in 
giving form to the formless, determination to the 
indeterminate, concept to the inconceivable, Echo 
indeed has the last word. But the word is a word 
of invitation, a word that beckons us to enter into 
the ineffable with Narcissus, as Narcissus. 
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